The House on Garibaldi Street Read online

  THE HOUSE ON GARIBALDI STREET

  CLASSICS OF ESPIONAGE

  General Editor: Wesley K. Wark

  Other titles in the Series

  Spies of the Kaiser by William Le Queux

  Introduction by Nicholas Hiley

  British Agent by John Whitwell

  Introduction by Wesley K. Wark

  The Serpent Sleeping by Edward Weismiller

  Introduction by Tim Naftali

  The Dark Invader by Captain Franz von Rintelen

  Introduction by Reinhard Doerries

  ISSER HAREL

  THE HOUSE ON GARIBALDI STREET

  Edited and with an introduction by

  SHLOMO J. SHPIRO

  First published 1975 by The Viking Press, Inc.

  Published 1997 by Frank Cass Publishers

  Published 2013 by Routledge

  2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

  711 Third Avenue, New York, NY, 10017, USA

  Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

  Copyright © 1997 Frank Cass and Co Ltd.

  Introduction Copyright © 1997 Shlomo J. Shpiro

  All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

  British Library Catloguing in Publication Data

  Harel, Isser

  The house on Garibaldi Street. - 2nd ed. - (Classics of espionage)

  1. Eichmann, Adolf, 1906–1962 - Kidnapping 2. Eichmann, Adolf, 1906–1962 - Trials, litigation, etc. 3. Trials (Genocide) - Israel 4. Secret Service – Israel 5. Espionage, Israel – Argentina 6. War criminals – Germany I. Title

  364.1’51’092

  Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

  Harel, Isser, 1912-

  The house on Garibaldi Street / Isser Harel; with an introduction by Shlomo J. Shpiro. — [New ed.]

  p. cm. — (Classics of espionage)

  ISBN 0–7146–4754–3 (cloth). — ISBN 0–7146–4315–7 (pbk.)

  1. Eichmann, Adolf, 1906–1962. 2. War criminals—Germany—Biography. 3. Secret service—Israel. 4. Harel, Isser, 1912–5. Israel. Mosad le-modi‘ in ṿe-tafḳidim meyuḥadim—Biography.

  I. Title. II. Series.

  DD247.E5H27 1997

  364.15T092—dc21 96–50134

  ISBN 13: 978-0-714-64315-1 (pbk)

  ISBN 13: 978-0-714-64754-8 (hbk)

  CONTENTS

  Introduction

  Maps

  Dramatis Personae

  THE HOUSE ON GARIBALDI STREET

  Index

  Introduction

  Shlomo J. Shpiro

  THE PUBLIC trial in Israel of Adolf Eichmann, the man who directed the Third Reich’s ‘Final Solution’, was held in 1961 under an unprecedented publicity coverage. The trial, which took place in Jerusalem, attracted hundreds of reporters and media crews from all over the world. For the first time since the end of the Second World War the horrific crimes of the Nazi regime against the Jewish people were exposed in all their brutality by one of their leading perpetrators. Eichmann stood at the top of the Gestapo pyramid dedicated to the destruction of Europe’s Jewry, and was personally responsible not only for policy decisions but for the everyday running of this unparalleled genocide. His trial and subsequent execution brought to millions of homes around the world the untold story of the Holocaust from its chief administrator.1 The Eichmann trial had a profound influence in particular on the young generation of Israeli citizens, born after the end of the Second World War. This generation, born into a country which had built itself as a national home for the Jewish people in order to prevent such persecution in the future, swore as it joined the army ‘never again’ to let Jewish people be led to their death unresisting.

  But this well-publicised trial was preceded by a top secret operation conducted by Israel’s foreign intelligence service - the Mossad. The Mossad carried out one of this century’s most audacious intelligence coups. Its undercover team, operating without official cover half-way across the globe from their base in Tel-Aviv, located Eichmann in Argentina, kidnapped and smuggled him to Israel to be handed over to the judicial authorities.

  The success of this complex intelligence operation depended not only on planning and professionalism but also on flexibility and improvisation in order to resolve numerous problems encountered during the mission. The Mossad team was led by Isser Harel, Israel’s ‘Memune’ - the top intelligence official in charge of the Mossad and its counterpart the Shabak – the internal security service. Harel’s presence on the ground throughout the operation enabled crucial decisions to be taken immediately without referring to higher authority. Harel’s leadership was critical to the success of the mission and to Eichmann’s being brought to justice. The House on Garibaldi Street is Harel’s personal and authoritative account of the Eichmann capture. Like many intelligence memoirs, while exciting on the details of operations, it reveals little of the man or his career.

  Isser Harel commanded both of Israel’s civilian intelligence organisations for over 12 years. More than anyone else he was responsible for transforming Israel’s fledgling intelligence services from a loose grouping of pre-independence underground organisations in 1948 to a community of formidable, professional and capable services. He was the only man in Israel’s history to hold the top position in both the internal and external intelligence organisations, and after his retirement in 1963 these jobs were separated and assigned to different people. Harel’s dedication to Israel’s security, his organisational capabilities and his relations with Israel’s leading politicians enabled him to develop the Mossad and carry out seemingly impossible missions. The achievements of the Mossad under Harel contributed greatly to Israel’s security and its political and military successes.

  Isser Harel was born Isser Halperin in Vitebsk, a small town in White Russia, in 1912.2 The youngest son of a rich industrialist, he showed his commitment to Jewish security early on by organising groups of young Jewish pupils to defend the community against anti-Semitic attacks. After the Revolution, the Halperin family, which lost all its property during the civil war, moved to Latvia. There the young Isser got involved with the new Zionist movement. He joined a Zionist student group and underwent agricultural training as part of his preparations to live in Palestine. In 1930 Harel moved to Palestine and joined a new kibbutz near Tel-Aviv. Working as an irrigation specialist, he met his future wife, Rivka. The couple got married and in 1935 left the kibbutz and settled in Herzliya. Isser joined the Hagana, a clandestine Jewish organisation founded to be the military arm of the Jewish community in Palestine. It was in the Hagana that his talents for intelligence work were spotted. Harel was employed in special duties involving undercover work and later assigned to work in the Shai – the Hagana’s intelligence branch.

  The Shai comprised a small group of dedicated but amateur operatives, working out of one flat in Tel-Aviv.3 It was the nucleus of Israel’s future intelligence services. The Shai developed the first intelligence systems and doctrines for covert work in the Arab countries, and spied not only on Arab parties and militant groups but on the British mandate authorities as well. Harel introduced to the work of Shai the elements of standardisation, thoroughness and professionalism. He organised its registry, collected reports and initiated its system of intelligence analysis. As a capable organiser he managed to obtain funds, facilities and personnel to expand the Shai’s collection capabilities as threats to the security of the Jewish communit
y in Palestine grew. The information collected by Shai was used by the Hagana to mount operations against British bases and Arab bands. Harel’s collection efforts were not limited to Arabs and British targets, but expanded to cover Jewish extremist organisations and later also the activities of the Soviets in Palestine.

  In his work at Shai Harel made contacts with leading politicians and, most important of all, with David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s elder statesman.4 It was the beginning of a life-long relationship which would lead both men to the peak of their careers, but also to bitter conflicts and differences of opinion. Ben-Gurion took a liking to the energetic young man and assigned him to more and more duties. When the state of Israel gained independence in 1948 it was only natural that Harel was called to take his place as the head of the newly founded Shabak – the internal security service.

  Harel’s first decision as head of the Shabak was that the service would be bound to the democratic principles of Israel and would not, in any of its actions, whether in war or peace, be above the law. Against strong voices which called for a ‘secret police’ type of organisation, which would intimidate political opponents of the ruling MAPAI party, Harel decreed that the intelligence services would not be involved in internal political affairs, and would always be directly controlled by the elected parliamentary authorities.5 The adherence to democratic principles, even at the price of possible operational successes, was to guide Harel throughout his command of the Shabak and the Mossad. Despite bitter political conflicts in Israel’s first years of independence not once were the intelligence services involved in political activities, outside counter-intelligence work aimed against Soviet subversion.6 Harel managed to keep the services apolitical, and the principles he developed of democratic control and accountability to the elected prime minister still govern the conduct of the Israeli intelligence services today.

  In 1952 Harel was appointed by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to head the newly founded Mossad – Israel’s foreign intelligence service.7 Throughout the 1950s he worked tirelessly to expand the capabilities of the service, and to create a network of co-operation with other intelligence organisations world-wide. Harel understood that, as a small and relatively poor country, Israel’s security could only be assured by a constant and reliable supply of information not only from its own intelligence services but also by those of the great powers. One of Harel’s most important successes in this field, and one which was to prove decisive for the security of the state of Israel in numerous wars and conflicts, was the development of Mossad’s relations with the CIA. To help establish the link with the Americans, Harel initiated a programme under which new immigrants coming to Israel from countries under Soviet control would be questioned for information of possible intelligence value. Thousands of new immigrants provided large quantities of information on all aspects of Soviet capabilities, from military industries to economic plans, research and development projects, to political, social and geographic reports. The information thus gleaned was provided to the CIA without anything in exchange. ‘Some people wanted to get something back right away’, recalls Harel. They saw the relations as a trading exchange.’ But Harel insisted that the information be provided as Israel’s contribution to the West’s security. This information was later used by the CIA in covert operations in Eastern Europe, and by the US Strategic Air Command in planning nuclear targets.8

  Within the CIA a small section was created to handle the relations with the Mossad. It was headed by James Angleton, the CIA’s notorious counter-intelligence expert, who directed these relations until his retirement in the 1970s9. Parallel to the CIA Harel developed working co-operation with many of the free world’s intelligence organisations, including the French and the British. A good part of these relations were developed through personal contact between the heads of the respective services, and many of these became welcomed guests not only at Mossad headquarters in Tel-Aviv but also at the Harel home.

  A special problem was presented by the relations with the West German federal intelligence service, the Bundesnach-richtendienst (BND), which was at that time headed by General Reinhard Gehlen, a former high ranking officer in Hitler’s Third Reich. Gehlen employed many former comrades-inarms, among them wanted Nazi criminals. While recognising the necessity of some working relationships with the Germans, Harel was loath to work with people who were involved with the Nazi regime. His relations with Gehlen remained strictly on a professional level, and Gehlen was not invited to visit Israel. The Mossad co-operated with the BND over various issues of mutual interest, mainly in Eastern Europe, but it was not until Gehlen’s retirement in 1968 that the relations developed into intensive co-operation efforts.

  In 1956 the Mossad landed a big coup with the CIA by supplying a copy of Nikita Khrushchev’s secret speech to the 20th Communist Party Congress condemning Stalin’s crimes and attacking his ‘cult of personality’.10 The CIA was aware of the content of the speech, given under heavy secrecy to selected communist delegates, and made extensive attempts to procure a copy for President Eisenhower. But it was a Mossad agent, working as a journalist in Warsaw, who managed to sneak a copy out of the offices of the Polish Communist Party and pass it on to his handler at the Israeli embassy. The success of this operation convinced Eisenhower of the value of intelligence relations with Israel, and the CIA began for the first time to pass secrets the other way – from the US to Israel. Copies of the speech were later distributed by the CIA in Eastern Europe by the million, and may have contributed ultimately to the distancing from the USSR of some of the Warsaw pact countries and to the 1968 uprising in Prague.

  Within Israel, the Shabak had to act against a growing number of agents dispatched by the Soviet KGB. The Russian embassy in Tel-Aviv became the centre of Soviet espionage activities against Israel, while Russian diplomats cultivated contacts with Israeli communists in their attempt to obtain secret information. In his counter-intelligence work Harel had to step a delicate line between unmasking spies and interfering with the legitimate work of the Israeli Communist Party, which operated legally. In the late 1950s and early 1960s Shabak agents uncovered several espionage cases involving Russian diplomats and gullible Israeli communist sympathisers. But the biggest catch was the unmasking in 1961 of Israel Ber, a top official at the Ministry of Defence, as a planted Soviet agent.11 Ber had worked for the Soviets for more than 15 years, using his contacts with Israel’s security elite, and even Ben-Gurion, to obtain secret information which was then passed on to his Soviet handlers. Ber was tried and sentenced to a long prison term, and the expulsion of the Soviet ‘diplomats’ involved dealt a heavy blow to the KGB’s networks in Israel.

  In his daily running of the services, Harel established a strict code of conduct. Intelligence officers were called upon to lie to the outside world as part of their job, he explained, but never within the organisation. He backed his men to the hilt, and would often visit the families of officers posted undercover abroad, taking personal care of their welfare. But Mossad operatives caught lying or fiddling with expense accounts knew they could expect no mercy. They were faced with immediate expulsion and forfeited their pension rights. These norms were required to be observed not only in professional but also in personal life. One junior officer told his wife he was going off on a dangerous duty – and ran off to a holiday with his mistress. After several days the wife called the office to inquire when her husband was expected back. The man was recalled at once and sacked on the spot.12 In a famous case often recited to new Mossad recruits, an Israeli agent was cultivating an Arab diplomat stationed in Europe as a potential source. This included lavishly wining and dining the prospective spy. On one occasion, after a hefty dinner, the agent escorted the Arab to an expensive brothel. Upon his return to Israel the agent filed his expense forms, which included two brothel fees. The man was at once called before Harel. The fact that you took the diplomat to a brothel and paid for his visit I see as a good operational decision’, said Harel, ‘but how dare you think that
the Israeli tax payer should pay for your sexual pleasures!’ The man was severely reprimanded and fined. Harel introduced the principle that under no circumstances would a female Mossad agent be required to use sexual means to obtain information. Under Harel the Mossad recruited many female operatives, and many women reached high positions within the organisation.

  In seeking personnel for the Mossad Harel turned it into the first truly ‘national’ government body, which hired people according to their personal qualifications and not their party affiliation. Yizchak Shamir, formerly the leader of the Ezel underground organisation and himself a target for Harel’s Shai activities, and who was later to become Israel’s prime minister in the 1980s, was offered a job by Harel. Harel convinced Ben-Gurion that expanding the capabilities of the Mossad was more important than old political rivalries, and Shamir joined to lead a special Mossad unit based in Paris.

  Under Harel’s leadership the Mossad developed its capabilities spying on Israel’s enemies. The emphasis was placed on using human sources – agents – as the main sources of information. The Mossad perfected long-term operations aimed at infiltrating Israeli agents into the very top of the political leadership in Arab states. Two of these agents, nourished during Harel’s time as head of the Mossad, attained world fame after their capture.

  In Syria, Mossad agent Eli Cohen climbed to the very top of the country’s political leadership. Cohen, operating under the cover of a rich merchant, befriended leading politicians and generals. Lavish parties in his luxurious home in Damascus were attended by many of Syria’s new rulers, and these provided their new friend with a large amount of military information, later radioed to Tel-Aviv on Cohen’s clandestine transceiver. Cohen was even invited by his army friends to tour the Syrian side of the Golan Heights, a military area strictly closed to all civilians. There, pretending to photograph his friends, Cohen made invaluable photographs of Syrian fortifications and weapon positions. His contacts in the Syrian elite expanded rapidly, and he was even considered for the position of a government minister. Cohen was captured after Syrian counter-intelligence located his transmissions, and was later publicly executed.13 But the information he provided was used in 1967 when Israel decided, during the Six-day War, to attack the heavily fortified Heights. Precision airstrikes based on Cohen’s information neutralised most of the Syrian heavy weapons. The Golan Heights were captured by Israeli troops in less than 48 hours of fighting.